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The authors set out two of the more common definitions of knowledge and argue that 
there are problems with attempts to apply these accounts of knowledge in argumentation 
theory. The problems suggest to them that a pragmatic approach to conceiving knowledge 




(1) One of the accounts they consider defines knowledge as true belief plus something 
else; propositional knowledge is some form of “good true belief” - for example, 
“rationally-held true belief”. This account, the authors hold, seems too restrictive to 
explain the actual role of knowledge in argumentation and inquiry. The truth condition is 
problematic: it impedes the role that knowledge can play in the process of argumentation. 
Consider the reason-giving role that knowledge plays in schemes like arguments from 
expert opinion:  
 
If the opinion of an expert is only acceptable when her opinion can independently be shown to be 
true, then there is no need to accept the opinion on the basis of the expert’s authority.  Rather, one 
should accept the opinion on whatever grounds one used to independently verify its truth. 
 
This objection assumes that if truth is a condition for propositional knowledge, then an 
expert’s opinion is acceptable only when it can independently be shown to be true. The 
authors do not argue for this assumption. Is the assumption true? (1) The alethic condition 
for knowledge is a truth condition for knowledge claims, not for acceptability claims (i.e., 
claims of the form “S’s opinion that p is acceptable”, or claims of the more precise form 
“S’s opinion that p is acceptable for X at time t”.) (2) A proponent of the alethic 
condition for knowledge need not hold that to be acceptable the opinion of an expert must 
be true, for she can acknowledge that a claim which it is reasonable to accept (and which 
is in this sense acceptable), given the evidence for it, may be false.  But if she is free to 
say this, then, a fortiori, she is free to say that to be acceptable an expert’s opinion need 
not be independently shown to be true. 
  The authors have a second objection to a “good true belief” (GTB) account of 
knowledge, namely:  
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[G]iven that the agents in argumentation are epistemically, cognitively and rationally finite and 
fallible, it is not reasonable to expect every claim to knowledge made at the beginning of the process 
of argumentation to be manifestly or demonstrably true prior to inquiry. 
 
But a proponent of a GTB account of knowledge need not deny this. She merely proposes 
a set of truth conditions for knowledge claims; she does not say, nor is she committed by 
her account of knowledge to saying, that a knowledge claim made at the beginning of a 
process of argumentation will be true, or, then, that it will be “manifestly or demonstrably 
true prior to inquiry”. 
As an alternative to the two accounts of knowledge they consider, the authors 
propose a pragmatic approach on which “‘knowledge is defeasible, meaning that a 
proposition now known may later be refuted (defeated as knowledge)’ … thus allowing 
for retraction in the process of inquiry, investigation, and discovery.” 
Walton proposes a pragmatic model of rationality and its attendant account of 
knowledge. On the pragmatic model of epistemic rationality, a group of interacting 
agents is collecting data in a search for the truth of a matter they are investigating. They 
verify or falsify hypotheses by testing them against data. As the search for knowledge 
continues, some hypotheses become better and better supported by evidence, but some 
previously accepted hypotheses are falsified and so have to be given up. There will be an 
established standard of proof (whose content will depend on the type of investigation) 
“that enables the investigation to determine whether a proposition can be accepted as 
proved or not”. So far, there is nothing for a GTB theorist to disagree with.  But the 
authors go on to say: 
 
A proposition rightly said to be known to be true at a given point in the investigation could later 
turn out to be proved to be false…. In this model, a particular proposition might rightly be 
classified as knowledge at one point in the investigation, whereas at a later point, the same 
proposition might turn out to be no longer classified as knowledge. In general, whether the 
proposition is rightly said to be knowledge or not depends on its rational acceptance, given the 
evidence then for it, as balanced against the evidence then against it, at that point in the 
investigation. 
 
A GTB theorist would not agree that a proposition rightly said to be known to be 
true at a given point in an investigation could later turn out to be proved to be false. If the 
proposition is said at t1 to be known to be true, but at a later time is proved to be false, it 
was not rightly said at t1 to be known to be true, for it was then false though it had not yet 
been proved to be. Or so a GTB theorist would say. She could, however, also say that a 
proposition might justifiably be said at t1 to be known to be true, given the evidence then 
for it as balanced against the evidence then against it, but might later be proved to be 
false. 
On Walton’s pragmatic approach, by contrast, knowledge does not require truth. 
For if it did, then a proposition could not rightly be classified as knowledge at some point 
in an investigation if at a later point it is proved to be false. Yet Walton’s account does 
not divorce knowledge from truth, for on his pragmatic model of rationality the search for 
knowledge is a search for truth and in the search process hypotheses get verified or 
falsified. Furthermore, falsifying a proposition that was earlier rightly said to be 
knowledge defeats the proposition’s status as knowledge. Now one might wonder how 
this can be if knowledge does not require truth.  But Walton’s view is not that a 
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proposition is rightly said at t1 to be knowledge only if it is true (or not false), but that it 
is rightly then said to be knowledge only if it has not then been shown to be false – i.e., 
falsified. If its status as knowledge is later defeated, this is because it is later falsified.  
But we might ask: how can it be that showing the proposition to be false has the 
consequence that its status as knowledge is defeated, but showing it to be, say, widely 
disbelieved does not? And we might be tempted to answer: to show a proposition to be 
false is to show that it fails to satisfy a condition that a proposition must satisfy to be 
knowledge, namely the condition of being true; whereas to show that a proposition is 
widely disbelieved is not to show that it fails to satisfy a condition that a proposition must 
satisfy to be knowledge. But for Walton it is the showing of a proposition to be false, not 
its being false, that defeats its earlier status as knowledge. On his account, a proposition, 
though false, can be knowledge at t1 but cannot be knowledge at a later time if it is then 
shown to be false.  The question we should ask is whether we need an account of this sort 
in order to get the result that the authors want – an account of knowledge that is 
satisfactory for argumentation theory. 
Consider what a GTB theorist might say. A proposition, p, may be justifiably said 
to be knowledge at some point in an investigation, but this knowledge claim – i.e., the 
claim that p is knowledge – may be defeated at a later point in the investigation by p’s 
being falsified. If the claim is defeated, then, a GTB theorist will say, p wasn’t knowledge 
at the earlier point in the investigation, even if it was justifiably then said to be. 
 
(2) The authors say that knowledge can play at least three roles in argumentation. 
Supposing that this is so, can a GTB theorist accommodate these roles? 
Role 1: Knowledge is often the starting place for argumentation. That is, 
argumentation commonly begins from premises or shared commitments that are known. 
A GTB theorist needn’t deny this, but would say that argumentation may begin from 
shared commitments that are taken to be known but are mistakenly so taken. Rather than 
say that knowledge is often the starting place for argumentation, a GTB theorist might 
prefer to say that knowledge claims are often the starting place for argumentation. The 
authors will not be impressed, for they say:  
 
[W]hat argumentation requires is a concept of knowledge that allows items of knowledge to be 
identified [i.e., rightly identified as knowledge, I take them to mean] at the beginning of a process 
of inquiry, even if this identification is only tentative and subject to retraction as the process of 
inquiry proceeds.  
 
But here I think the authors are begging the question against a GTB theorist. A GTB 
theorist could say that argumentation requires a concept of knowledge that allows 
propositions to be justifiably identified as knowledge (and thus justifiably taken to be part 
of the inquirers’ knowledge-base) at the beginning of a process of inquiry, “even if this 
identification is only tentative and subject to retraction as the process of inquiry 
proceeds.”  Why does argumentation require a concept of knowledge that allows 
propositions to be rightly, as distinct from justifiably, identified as knowledge at the 
beginning of a process of inquiry? The authors don’t say, and this is why I think they beg 
the question against a GTB theorist. 
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Role 2: Knowledge can be the desired end-state of argumentation. Argumentation 
that aims at the discovery of the truth of a matter implicitly aims at knowledge. A GTB 
theorist won’t disagree. 
Role 3: Knowledge can play a reason-giving role in argumentation. That is, 
premises asserting that a certain claim is known, or that an agent is in a position to know 
some claim, can be used as a reason for the acceptability of the claim itself or some other 
claim. Again, a GTB theorist won’t disagree, but she would say that a premise asserting 
that a certain claim is known, or that an agent is in a position to know some claim, may 
be false, though justifiably believed. This being so, a GTB theorist might prefer to say not 
just that knowledge can play a reason-giving role in argumentation, but that so can 
premises that are justifiably but mistakenly taken to be knowledge. 
 
(3) The authors hold that knowledge must have certain qualities in order to fulfil its 
functions in argument. (1) The knowledge states of rational agents (i.e., arguers) can be 
incomplete; rational agents are cognitively limited – e.g., they can forget things they once 
knew. (2) They have finite reasoning abilities: for example, they can’t be expected to 
know all of the implications of their current knowledge state or to detect every 
inconsistency in some knowledge-base. (3) Knowledge claims can be based on defeasible 
support. This fact, and the fact that knowers are epistemically limited, leads to the idea 
that knowledge claims are themselves defeasible.  Agents can make a legitimate claim to 
knowledge and yet be wrong. Hence the standard of certainty does not seem appropriate 
for all claims to knowledge. A GTB theorist can agree with (1). She can also agree with 
(2)’s claim that rational agents have finite reasoning abilities and with the point that 
rational agents can’t be expected to know all of the implications of their current 
knowledge state; and she can say that rational agents can’t be expected to detect every 
inconsistency in some set of propositions that they justifiably take to be knowledge. As 
for (3), it is striking that the authors here speak not of knowledge but of knowledge 
claims, as I think a GTB theorist would want to do in this context. 
 
(4) So far, then, it does not appear that the authors have shown their pragmatic approach 
to knowledge to be preferable to a GTB account for the purposes of argumentation 
theory.   
 
(5) At the end of their paper they say that truth is an objective criterion of knowledge. 
This is an unexpected remark, given the authors’ earlier account of their pragmatic model 
of knowledge. They add, however, that truth is not “an especially useful criterion in cases 
where it is not manifest, apprehended, or demonstrable – in short unknown.” But a GTB 
theorist might reply that truth is a most useful criterion of knowledge in such cases 
precisely because it enables us to say that in such cases we don’t have knowledge. And it 
isn’t obvious that this reply isn’t satisfactory for the purposes of argumentation theory.  
 
link to paper
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